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This paper analyzes the link between firm size and the investment in job training by 
employers. Using a large firm level data set across 99 developing countries, we show that a 
strong and positive correlation in the investment in job training and firm size is a robust 
statistical finding both within and across countries with very different institutions and level of 
development. However, our findings do not support the view that this difference is mostly 
driven by market imperfections disproportionally affecting SMEs. Rather, our evidence is 
supportive of SMEs having a smaller expected return from the investment in job training than 
larger firms. Therefore, our findings call for caution when designing pro-SME policies 
fostering the investment in on the job training. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  J24, D24 
  





Rita K. Almeida 
The World Bank 
1818 H Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20433 
USA 
E-mail: ralmeida@worldbank.org   
 
                                                 
* We thank the research assistance of Marta Faria at an early stage. The authors benefited from 
comments provided by Andreas Bloom, T. Gindling, Yoon Cho, David Newhouse, David Margolis and 
Pedro Carneiro. We also thank participants at a World Bank HDNSP seminar and at the 5
th IZA-WB 
conference on Employment and Development in South Africa. This project would not have been 
possible without the financial support of a World Bank Development Economics Research Support 
Grant.   2 
1.  Motivation  
The international community has long recognized the important role of small and 
medium  enterprise  sector  (SMEs)  in  the  economies  of  the  developing  world. 
Furthermore, policymakers all over the world worry with how to foster productivity and 
growth among this group of firms. Moreover, in a modern economy, the investment in 
human  capital  is  crucial  to  foster  technological  adoption  and,  thus,  achieve  higher 
productivity growth. This paper explores a large firm level survey across 99 countries to 
document the differences in the job training provided by employers across firm size. Our 
findings show that a strong and positive correlation across the investment in job training 
and firm size is a robust empirical finding within and across countries with different 
institutions and income levels. However, our data does not support the view that this 
difference is fully explained by market imperfections and institutional failures impeding 
SME development. Rather, it is supportive of SMEs having a smaller expected rate of 
return from this investment. Finally, our findings call for some caution when designing 
pro-SME policies tackling these imperfections to effectively remove this investment gap. 
Policies addressing market imperfections will be most effective when targeting all firms, 
irrespectively of firm size.  
The importance of the SME sector throughout the developing world is undeniable. 
First, SMEs account for more than half of manufacturing employment in many countries 
(e.g., Ayyagari et al, 2007). Second, there is also a growing recognition of the role that 
SMEs play in sustained global and regional economic growth, higher employment and 
poverty  alleviation.  Moreover,  few  economists  disagree  that  SMEs  face  greater 
constraints to their growth than large firms. Access to finance usually ranks high among 
these constraints and is often pointed as the main reason behind SMEs having a smaller 
capacity to invest. However, there is little systematic research supporting the various 
policies  in  support  of  SMEs  primarily  because  of  the  lack  of  data.  Nevertheless, 
documenting  and  understanding  the  main  binding  constraints  to  firm  growth  in 
developing countries is crucial for the design of effective policies that promote long run 
productivity growth by the private sector.  
The investment in human capital has been widely documented as a core component of 
each individual‟s human development, firm growth and aggregate productivity growth   3 
(Lucas, 1988). For example, Heckman et al (1998) estimate that individuals invest in 
human capital over the whole life-cycle, but more than one half of lifetime human capital 
is accumulated through post-schooling investments taking place on the job. Moreover, 
differences in total factor productivity account for approximately half of the differences 
in income across countries and are generally associated with differences in technological 
progress  (e.g.  Hall  and  Jones,  1999).  These  differences  are  also  large  between  firms 
within  a  single  country  (Hsieh  and  Klenow,  2007)  and  technology  adoption  and 
investment in human capital are shown to be a core factors in explaining how firms catch 
up  to  the  technology  frontier,  and  for  designing  policies  to  enhance  growth  and 
development. Surprisingly, very little research has been done on the differences across 
firms in the investment in job training around the developing world and the reason also 
relates to lack of data.  
This paper explores a unique firm level data set across 99 countries in the developing 
world to (1) document how different are the propensities to invest in job training across 
firm sizes; and to (2) investigate the reasons behind this differential. In particular, we 
conjecture that SMEs could be less likely to invest in job training because of three broad 
set  of  reasons.  First,  the  expected  return  on  the  investment  in  job  training  might  be 
smaller for SMEs. This could happen if either SMEs have lower expected benefits or 
higher marginal costs of the investment in job training. Second, SMEs could be more 
likely to lack the financial resources to invest, in spite of the possibly large expected 
returns. Third, in spite of a possibly large average returns, SMEs could have worse access 
to information, face greater uncertainty regarding the returns of this investment or have 
larger coordination problems with their workers than larger firms.  
We explore a large firm level data set, Enterprise Surveys, collected by the World 
Bank with unique information to study these questions. First, the surveys explore an 
almost standardized questionnaire across countries, and thus collect information that is 
comparable  across  and  within  countries.  Second,  the  surveys  are  available  for  99 
developing  countries  covering  all  the  geographical  regions  of  the  world  and  income 
levels. This wide range of countries covered allows us to test the extent to which the 
existing differentials are explained by differences across countries in their institutions and 
policies. Third, the survey collect detailed firm characteristics including variables that are   4 
good proxies for the firm‟s access to information and external finance, measures of the 
degree  of  openness  and  technological  innovation,  measures  of  the  human  capital 
composition of the workforce and on the perceptions regarding the investment climate. 
The availability of several worker and firm characteristics will allow us to analyze the 
role  of  different  factors  in  explaining  the  correlation  between  the  investment  in  job 
training and firm size.  
Unfortunately, survey limitations  also  affect  the  scope of the  analysis  behind  our 
control. First, in most countries the surveys are representative of the formal sector, and 
particularly  of  the  manufacturing  sector.  Since  in  developing  countries  the  informal 
sector  can  reach  more  than  half  the  workforce,  this  will  naturally  limit  the 
representativeness of the analysis to the informal or non-manufacturing sectors. Still, we 
expect that most of the job training taking place in the informal sector to be more of the 
type of learning-by-doing rather than formal training programs (see Johansen and Van 
Adams, 2004). Second, the surveys collect only information on formal training programs, 
leaving  undocumented  any  informal  job  training  taking  place  while  on  the  job  (e.g., 
learning by doing).
2 Therefore, we will likely underestimate the overall investment in job 
training, particularly among the smaller enterprises, where informal training is likely to 
be more important (e.g., Frazer, 2006, Velenchik, 1995, Teal 1996, Monk et al, 2008).
3 
Nevertheless,  our focus on formal training  programs  is still  economically  and policy 
relevant. 
The paper documents several interesting findings. First, we find robust evidence of a 
large  and  statistically  significant  positive  correlation  between  firm  size  and  the 
investment in job training. In particular, we find that small (11-50 permanent employees), 
medium  (50-250  employees)  and  large  firms  (more  than  250  employees)  train 
approximately 13, 30 and 40 percentage points more than micro firms (with 10 or less 
                                                 
2 The job training supplied by the firm does not necessarily take place during the normal working period 
nor is it necessarily accredited. The Enterprise Surveys explicitly refers to “formal programs” in the survey 
questionnaire does ruling out any form of learning by doing. Since this is employer provided training, we 
do expect that training benefits both the firm and workers simultaneously. Otherwise, one of them would 
prevent form engaging in this investment.  
3  In developing countries,  training  in  the formal manufacturing sector  takes  different forms. First,  the 
technical and vocational training ; Second the apprenticeship system, which  is mostly  informal and has 
more relevance in Western Africa and; Third,  any other formal manufacturing sector training still carried 
out within firms. In spite of the importance of all these strategies for skills development  there is  little 
research in each of these topics. This paper contributes to this literature by focusing on the third channel.   5 
employees). Second, our findings show that these differences are robust across countries 
in  different  geographical  regions  and  income  levels  and,  thus,  also  with  different 
institutional  and  economic  backgrounds.  Interestingly  our  findings  show  that  the 
disadvantage of micro firms relatively to large firms is greater for firms operating in the 
Middle East and North Africa and in Africa, as well as for low income countries where 
training incidence is very low. Moreover, within countries, this pattern is also robust to 
firms  with  similar  patterns  of  investment  in  innovation  and  technology  adoption, 
operating in the same sector of activity and located in the same city. 
 Third,  we  find  robust  evidence  that  the  differences  across  firm  sizes  in  the 
investment in job training are not fully explained by differences across small and large 
firms in the access to information and external finance, facility in the coordination with 
workers or in the degree of perceived economic uncertainty. Even though we find that the 
disadvantage  of  SMEs  in  all  these  factors  associated  with  market  imperfections  do 
explain their lower provision of job training across the developing world, quantitatively, 
they  are  not  the  main  explanatory  factor.  This  small  explanatory  power  of  market 
imperfections is again a robust finding across geographical regions and countries with 
different levels of development. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that the SMEs 
smaller expected returns to the investment in job training play an important role in this 
under investment. Moreover, differences across firms in the returns of investing in job 
training seem to be mostly driven by SMEs facing higher expected marginal costs rather 
than  lower  expected  marginal  benefits.  Unfortunately,  we  cannot  formally  test  this 
assumption due to the lack of data.
4  
It is worth stressing two features of our empirical work. First, we do not directly 
address the problem of the determinants of the firm size distribution at the country level. 
Rather we take the distribution of firm size as given within countries and investigate the 
impact of this predetermined size structure in the investment in job training at th e firm 
level. Nevertheless, our data shows substantial differences in the distribution of firm sizes 
across countries. And a significant part of these differences are likely to relate with 
                                                 
4 Unfortunately our data has no information on the direct costs of training and thus we cannot formally 
show  that  high  marginal  costs  of  investing  in  job  training  are  an  important  deterrent  for  small  firms. 
Almeida and Carneiro (2009) explore data for Portugal during the 80s and find robust evidence of large 
fixed costs associated with the investment in job training.   6 
differences across countries in institutions like product and factor regulations, or in the 
fiscal  policy  (e.g.,  Kumar  et  al,  1999).
5  However, in our empirical   analysis, we will 
always  condition  on  country  and  sector  heterogeneity  and  thus  only  explore  within 
country and sector variation across firm size. Moreover, we will also test the robustness 
of our findings to when exploring variation within country, sector and city.  
Second, even though our main empirical findings survive a battery of tests, we cannot 
ultimately rule out that the positive correlation between firm size and the investment in 
job training is driven by a reverse causality argument. In particular, this will be of greater 
concern if one thinks that the explanatory variable (firm size) is a leading indicator – not 
a causal indicator – of the firm‟s investment in job training.
6 However, it is reassuring to 
see that the differential in the investment across firm sizes is robust to several cuts in our 
sample as well as to the control of many firm observed characteristics (e.g., managerial 
education, contract structure within the firm or perceptions of the economic uncertainty) 
or unobserved country-sector and city variables.
7  
The findings in this paper have  important  policy  implications  for the design  of 
policies supporting the investment in job training among SMEs in the developing world. 
Even though our evidence is supportive of quantitatively important differences across 
firm sizes, these differences are not primarily explained by variables closely linked with 
important market imperfections. We argue that the differences in the expected return of 
investing across firms probably play a more important role . Therefore, simply from an 
                                                 
5 In developing countries, several regulations tend to favor the existence of micro or small firms because 
they apply only to firms above a certain employment threshold. Kumar et al (1999) explain differences in 
firm size across countries with the role the institutions such as the judicial and the financial systems. 
6 If the direction of causality runs from the investment in job training to larger firm size, and if the decision 
to invest in job training is persistent over time, then the positive correla tion between firm size at a point in 
time in the and the investment in job training after that could be due to the fact that the firms investing 
more in job training subsequently had already larger firm sizes in the previous period. This would thus 
induce an ex-post correlation in the data. We argue that this is a source of small concern because the 
question posed to firms refers to job training taking place over the last two years, while firm sixe refers 
only to the previous year.  
7 Unfortunately, for most countries in our sample the  Enterprise Surveys lack longitudinal information on 
the investment in job training. Thus we will not be able to account for firm heterogeneity in unobservable 
factors by exploring time series variation in the investment in job training. Nevertheless, we conjecture that 
the availability of a short panel of data would not be of much help given the likely persistency in the job 
training investment. This would naturally limit the explanatory power of exploring changes in the intensity 
to train (see e.g., Dearden et al, 2005).    7 
efficiency perspective, a pro-SME intervention in this market is not necessarily needed or 
desirable. However, the SME investment in job training could be supported for other 
reasons. First, this investment could create positive externalities on aggregate growth if it 
leads to higher innovation and technological adoption and, thus, potentially foster market 
competition. Second, it could also support poverty alleviation if SMEs are more labor 
intensive than other firms and on the job training fosters growth. To our knowledge there 
is little empirical evidence supporting both the causal link between SMEs and innovation 
on the one hand and on the SME‟s higher labor intensity on the other hand.  
Finally, our findings are supportive of policy interventions targeting the access to 
information and external finance, the facility in coordination between firms and workers 
and  mitigating  the  perceived  uncertainty  in  the  investment  climate  generating  higher 
incentives  to  invest  across  all  firm  sizes.  Moreover,  institutional  and  policy  reforms 
fostering the integration of firms in the global markets and leading to more technological 
innovations  (e.g.,  through  lower  regulations  on  firm  entry/exit)  will  also  foster  the 
investment in job training across all firm sizes. The fact that this type of interventions 
does not overwhelmingly benefit SMEs relatively to larger firms has been supported by 
others  looking  at  different  interventions  (e.g.,  Ibarraran,  Maffioli  and  Stucchi,  2009). 
Even though improving institutions and the investment climate is an effective way of 
relaxing  some  constraints  firms  face,  institution  building  is  a  long  term  process.  
Meanwhile, improving the access to credit, reducing economic uncertainty or promoting 
the access to information about training opportunities could yield modest but positive 
returns.  
Our paper relates with two strands of the literature. First we relate to the literature 
analyzing the patterns and determinants of the investment in job training. In spite of the 
importance of the topic for both individuals and firms, the systematic empirical evidence 
based  on  micro  data  on  on-the-job  training  in  the  developing  world  is  still  scant. 
Exceptions  include  the  work  by  Frazer,  2006,  Teal,  1996,  Velenchik,  1995,  Lopez-
Acevedo and Tan, 2003, Rosholm et al, 2007, Pierre and Scarpetta, 2004, Almeida and   8 
Aterido, 2008.
8 Some interesting patterns have been documented at the firm level for 
developed countries, including the advantage of large firms in this investment (e.g., Black 
and Lynch, 2001, Lillard and Tan, 1986,  Leuven and Oosterbeek, 1999, Royalty, 1996, 
and  Bassanini  et  al,  2005,  for  OECD  countries).  However,  to  our  knowledge,  no 
empirical work to date has documented the robustness of in this difference within and 
across countries with  many institutional and economic di fferences. Moreover,  to our 
knowledge no other papers to date have analyzed the determinants of these differences in 
the investment patterns across firm size looking especially at developing countries.  
Second, we relate to the empirical literature looking at the growth constraints facing 
SMEs in the developing world.  Some papers analyze the differences between small and 
large firms in their growth and productivity and on how these relate to differences in the 
general  business  environment  (e.g.,  Van  Biesebroeck,  2005,  Ibarraran,  et  al,  2009, 
Aterido,  Hallward-Driemeier  and  Pages,   2010).  A  particularly  large  strand  of  this 
literature looks at differences across firm sizes in the access  to external finance (e.g, 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2005, Galindo and Micco, 2007). Some papers 
have  also  analyzed  differences  across  small  and  large  firms  in  other  performance 
indicators  like  the   investment  in  innovation  and  technological  adopt ion  (De  Mel, 
McKenzie and Woodruff, 2009). While it is unquestionable that SMEs play an important 
role in the developing world, most analysis do not lend foundation for policies supporting 
SMEs (e.g., through subsidizing SME‟s investments). However, most of micro analyses 
have been criticized for being country or region specific. Moreover, to our knowledge no 
previous work has investigated the empirical determinants of the lower investment by 
SMEs in job training. We follow Beck et al, (2005) and Ibarraran et al, (2009) and ask 
whether cross-country evidence provides an empirical basis for pro-SME policies.
9  
                                                 
8  Middleton  et  al  (1993)  and  Johanson  and  Van  Adams  (2004)  have  interesting  discussions  on  the 
investment in job training around the developing world. However, they resort mostly to anecdotal evidence 
based on country case studies.  
9 There is a large debate around the benefits and costs of SME based policies. The  micro evidence at the 
country level does not provide much support for the view that SMEs have a greater effect on productivity, 
employment and growth than large firms. In particular, the bulk of the firm-level evidence does not support 
the contention that SMEs are particularly effective job creators (Rosenzweig, 1988; Brown et al., 1990, 
Little, et al., 1987). Furthermore, research also does not univer sally support the claim that SMEs foster 
particularly innovation (Pagano and Schivardi, 2003; Pack and Westphal, 1986). Finally, while some firm-
level studies find that SMEs intensify competition, there is little direct evidence on the positive effects of   9 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the data set 
used. Section 3 discusses alternative reasons why SMEs could be less likely to invest in 
job training than larger firms. Section 4.1 documents the differences across firm sizes in 
the intensity to train and section 4.2 analyzes the heterogeneity of these findings across 
alternative samples within and across countries. Section 5.1 discusses the extent to which 
training  differences  across  firm  sizes  could  relate  to  differences  in  the  return  of  this 
investment or in the role of different market imperfections impeding SME development. 
Section 5.2 discusses the empirical evidence supporting each factor. Section 6 concludes 
and draws policy implications.   
 
2.  Data 
  Our analysis explores a large firm level data set, the Enterprise Survey, collected 
by the World Bank across several developing countries. For each of the 99 countries in 
our sample, we select the most recent wave of data available. The only exception relates 
to a few countries where we have included a previous wave to the most recent one to 
insure a more comprehensive coverage of the relevant variables explored in our analysis. 
The final data set covers more than 48,000 firms operating in 99 developing countries 
and surveyed between 2002 and 2007.   
The Enterprise Surveys are one of the best data sets to analyze the employer provided job 
training across developing countries. First, the surveys collect comparable information 
for several firm characteristics across all the countries. This comparability allows us to 
document  cross  country  and  within  country  profiles  of  firms  offering  job  training. 
Second, the survey collects information on training intensity at the firm level as well as 
several other firm and workforce characteristics. These include the firm size and age, 
human capital composition of the workforce, measures of R&D and technology adoption 
and  firm  openness.  In  addition,  there  is  also  detailed  information  on  the  firm‟s 
geographical location and its sector of activity (2-digit-ISIC classification). Third, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
SME  policy  on  productivity  growth.  One  reason  could  relate  with  firm  size  not  being  an  exogenous 
determinant of growth so that SME policies could distort firm size and hurt economic efficiency (Kumar, et 
al., 2001, Caves et al., 1980). Alternatively, policies promoting a sound business environment (through low 
entry/exit  barriers,  well  defined  property  rights,  and  effective  contract  enforcement)  could  be  more 
conducive to market competition but the benefits are not only restricted to SMEs.   10 
surveys reach a substantial number of countries across all the regions of the world. Table 
A1 reports the country and regional coverage of the sample (22% of the sample is in 
Africa,  20.7%  of  the  sample  in  East  Asia,  17.4%  in  Eastern  Europe,  21%  in  Latin 
America, 9% in MENA and 9% in South Asia). This wide coverage allow us to document 
several cross country correlations between the investment in job training and country 
level indicators as the country‟s level of development, institutional quality or general 
educational attainment. Finally, the surveys have the advantage of collecting information 
on the training flows. This information is likely to be a more accurate measure of recent 
job training than in surveys attempting to measure the stock of training at the firm level 
(see e.g., Bassanini et al, 2005).
10 In sum, the Enterprise Surveys are an excellent source 
of micro data on employer provided training but also of cross country statistics. They are 
by  far  one  of  the  most  comprehensive  sources  of  comparable  firm  level  data  in  the 
developing world (see e.g., Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier and Pages, 2011, Almeida and 
Fernandes, 2008, Ibarraran et al, 2009). Moreover, even when comparing with data for 
developed  countries  (e.g.,  as  in  Black  and  Lynch,  2001,  for  the  US)  they  have  the 
advantage of having a high response rates on information for job training and have the 
advantage of not exploring recall information. Moreover, because the data is collected at 
the firm level, it contains information simultaneously for firm and some worker level 
characteristics.
11  
  We measure training intensity at the firm level by computing a dummy variable 
that equals one when the firm reports having supplied formal training to their workers. 
The exact question in the survey is: “Do you offer formal (beyond “on-the-job”) training 
to  your  permanent  employees?”.  On  average,  39%  of  the  firms  in  the  sample  report 
                                                 
10 The Enterprise Surveys also collect information on the extensive training margin for some countries, 
including  the  percentage  of  skilled  and  unskilled  workers  trained  at  the  firm  level  as  well  as  some 
information on the training hours. We have also found robust size training premiums for the share of both 
skilled and unskilled workers (not reported but available on request).  
11 The Enterprise Surveys have been used in the study closely related topics by Pierre and Scarpetta (2004), 
Almeida and Aterido (2008), Almeida and Fernandes (2008), Rosholm et al (2007) or Almeida (2009). A 
previous  version  of  this  survey  was  also  used  by  Frazer  (2006)  and  Teal  (1996)  for  Ghana  and  by 
Kahyarara and Teal (2008) for Tanzania (World Bank Regional Program on Enterprise Development). 
They have also been extensively used in studying the related topic on how the business environment affects 
firm growth and performance (e.g., Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier and Megistae, 2005, Aterido, Hallward-
Driemeier and Pages, 2011)   11 
offering  job  training  to  their  employees.  However,  figure  1  illustrates  well  the  wide 
dispersion across regions of the world and countries. Firms in Africa and in South Asia 
are the ones training the least in our sample, while firms in Latin America are among the 
highest trainers. Table A2 in the appendix defines all the variables used in the paper. 
Some firms in the data report missing information on job training. This could raise some 
concerns regarding some biases on misreporting.
12  
It is worth  discussing firms could differ significantly in how they define a  formal job 
training program, across countries, sectors and  possibly even firm sizes. While all the 
training events refer to formal programs supplied by the firm, they are likely to differ  in 
content,  organization  and  financing.
13  For  example,  even  though  all  programs  are 
provided by the firm, the training is not necessarily financed equally by the firm and their 
workers. In some firms, w orkers might  be willing to  support part of the  cost,  either 
directly or indirectly (e.g., through lower wages). The training might  also have a more 
general or firm specific content  or it can differ depending on whether it is delivered by 
                                                 
12 Table A3 in the appendix presents a simple model documenting whether the firms with missing data on 
the question on whether they provide job training differ systematically from other firms. The findings show 
that firms with missing data are, on average, smaller, younger and have some share of public ownership. 
Firms are also located in the capital city and have a more skilled workforce than firms reporting non-
missing information on job training. Firms operating in non-manufacturing sectors (like retail or services) 
are also more likely to report missing data than firms in manufacturing. Even though this could be a source 
of concern, we have analyzed our main findings assuming two extreme scenarios: first assuming all the 
missing reporting is associated either with no investments in job training; second, assuming all the missing 
reporting  is  associated  with  investing  in  job  training.  Reassuringly,  the  point  estimates  in  these  two 
scenarios would remain qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to our main results (tables 3 through 
5). Under the first scenario de point estimates for the baseline specification (table 3, column 3) would 
become 11.5, 29.2 and 38.2 for small, medium and large sized firms, while in the second scenario the point 
estimates would become 15.3, 33.8 and 43.1 percentage points, respectively. Moreover, also reassuringly, 
there would not be significant differences in the relative importance of the factors discussed throughout 
sections 4 and 5 in the paper. 
13 Since we explore a firm level survey, we assume this question relates to the acquisition of skills required 
for work.  However, the characteristics of the training supplied by each firm are likely  to differ. First, 
trainings could take place inside or outside the normal working period. Second, it can be formally or 
informally accredited. Third, it can be offered within or outside the firm. From the precise question asked 
being asked it is unclear th e type of training being offered.  However, since the survey covers mostly 
formal sector firms and the question refers to  formal training (“beyond on the job”), we assume that the 
survey  captures  mostly  formal  training  episodes  taking  place  off  the  working  period.  This  comes  in 
opposition to the informal training, which tends to take place during the working period and usually does 
not  result  in  a  specific  qualification.  The  latter  is  more  difficult  to  measure.  Nevertheless,  and 
independently of the training type, we do expect the training to benefit jointly firms and workers through 
higher productivity and/or wages. Otherwise, one of the parties would not be willing to engage in it.    12 
the firm itself or by a (private or public) training institute. Nevertheless, independently of 
these differences, the training provided is likely to be productivity enhancing for both 
firms  and  workers.  This  heterogeneity  in  the  service  provided  illustrates  well  the 
complexity  of  comparing  training  incidence  across  countries.    We  assume  that  these 
differences  in  training  content  become  less  relevant,  and  eventually  vanish,  when 
comparing firms within the same country, city and sector of activity. This will be our 
main strategy throughout the empirical work.  
  The final sample covers more than 48,000 firms with non-missing training data 
across  all  the  regions  of  the  world.  Table  A1  in  the  appendix  reports  the  country 
composition of the final sample. The final sample covers both manufacturing (78%) and 
non-manufacturing (22%) sectors. Within manufacturing the sample covers: Food and 
beverages  (17%),  Chemicals  and  Plastics  (14%),  Electronics  (8%),  Textiles  (10%), 
Garments and Leather (20%), Metals and Machinery (19%), Paper, wood and furniture 
(10%) and Other (3%). Because the Enterprise Surveys cover in a more consistent way 
the manufacturing sectors across all the countries, in the empirical work that follows we 
will test the robustness of our main results to the exclusion of this group. This is of 
particular concern when we compute the correlation between training and productivity 
due to the well known problems of measuring productivity in non-manufacturing sectors 
(e.g., Griliches, 1994).  
  Figure 1 reports training incidence at the country level in our sample. Incidence is 
captured by the share of firms having provided on-the-job training. The dispersion in this 
figure is sticking.  Developing world is very heterogeneous regarding the job training 
outcomes. Countries located in South Asia, Middle East and in Africa are among the ones 
supplying fewer job training. In particular, firms in Pakistan and Senegal report training 
incidence as low as 11% and 15%, respectively. Rather, firms in Eastern Europe, East 
Asia and in Latin America report higher training intensities. At least 70% of the firms in 
Slovakia,  Chile  and  Thailand  offer  job  training  programs  to  their  workforce. 
Nevertheless, one must be cautious when comparing these cross country incidences as 
they are likely to be affected by measurement error.  
Table  1  reports  the  summary  statistics  for  the  main  variables  used  in  the  paper.  On 
average there are 30% of micro firms (up to 10 permanent employees), 37% of small   13 
firms (between 11 and 50 permanent vemployees), 19% of medium firms (between 50 
and  250  permanent  employees)  and  7.7%  of  large  firms  (more  than  250  permanent 
employees). The average firm in the sample is 16.5 years old and has a 51% probability 
of being located in the capital or in a large city. On average, workers have 7 years of 
schooling (equivalent to incomplete secondary). In addition, 24.5% of the firms in the 
sample export, 11.8% have at least 10% of foreign capital and 54% have recently adopted 
new technology. Finally, most of the firms in the sample are in the manufacturing sector. 
Among these only 23% of the firms operate in high technology sectors like Electronics, 
Chemicals and Pharmacy, auto equipment and machinery. The remaining 77% operate in 
low technology sectors like Textiles, Garments, Agro-industry, wood and furniture, and 
plastics.  
Table 2 reports interesting correlations across firm profiles and training incidence. 
We  divide  the  sample  into  training  and  non-training  firms  and  summarize  the  main 
variables of interest. The evidence supports the common view that training firms tend to 
be larger, more open and older than non-training firms. They also operate in more capital 
intense sectors, have higher labor productivity and pay higher wages. Furthermore, they 
have a more skilled workforce and invest more in technology than non-training firms.  
 
3.  The Differential in Job Training by Firm Size: Modeling the Determinants  
We  consider  next  a  simple  empirical  model  to  document  the  size-job  training 
differential.  Assume that firm i in industry j and in country c decides whether or not to 
train its workers if the present value of expected profits from this investment (future 
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Even though we cannot observe the expected profit 
*
ijc   (latent variable) in our data, we 
do observe whether the firm offers job training to its employees. We assume that the 
firm´s profit of investing in job training is linear function of the firm size and of other 
firm  observable  characteristics ijc X ,  its  country-sector  of  activity  cj  :
ijc cj ijc ijc X Size ijc         
*
,  where    ijc  captures  the  firm  unobservable  characteristics   14 
correlated with the return of investing in job training. Given this latent functional form, 
the probability that firm i offers job training is given by: 
) Pr( ) 1 Pr( cj ijc ijc ijc ijc X Size Train                                      (2) 
Equation (2) can be estimated by maximum likelihood assuming that the error term is 
normally distributed (probit model).  Variable  ijc Size includes four firm size dummies: 
micro (up to 10 employees), small (11-50 employees), medium (51-250 employees) and 
large (more than 250 employees).
14 In  ijc X we include proxy measures for the degree of 
firm openness (dummy variable when the firm exports more than 10% of total sales or 
has  more  than  10%  of  foreign  owned  capital),  public  capital  ownership,  intensity  of 
technology adoption and for the human capital of the workforce.  cj   are the country and 
3-digit ISIC interaction sector dummy variables.
15 Standard errors are clustered at the 
country  and sector level to capture  any  auto-correlation  of the residuals  across firms 
within countries and sectors.   
The main coefficients of interest in equation (3) are the   ‟s for each of the size 
dummies.  In  the  empirical  work  the  omitted  category  will  always  be  micro  firms, 
therefore the   reports the percentage point difference in the training incidence for small, 
medium and large firms relatively to micro firms.  It is worth highlighting that we always 
control  for  country  and  sector  fixed  effects. Accounting  for  country  fixed  effects  is 
important  since  countries  differ  in  the  strength  of  their  institutions  and  investment 
climate, and this is likely to simultaneously influence the incentives of firms in providing 
on the job training as well as the firm size distribution in the economy. For example, we 
expect  that  countries  with  regulatory  institutions  favoring  larger  firms  to  have a  size 
distribution of firms that is more skewed towards bigger firms, which in turn might offer 
more training. Furthermore, allowing for country and 3-digit sector fixed effects accounts 
for differences across firms (within countries) in the capital intensity of their technology 
                                                 
14 The threshold for firm size dummies are somewhat arbitrary and often differ across countries and studies. 
Our definition follows Aterido et al (2010) and differentiates small firms from micro firms. It is reassuring 
to see that our results go through with alternative definitions.    
15 We have a total of 1,089 dummy variables f or the 99 countries and eleven three - digit ISIC sectors of 
activity  (including  Food  and  Agro -industry,  Textiles,  Garments  and  leather,  Metal  and  Machinery, 
Electronics, Chemicals and Plastics, Construction, Retailing, Services, Wood, Furniture and Paper a nd 
Other industries).  
   15 
which will also simultaneously affect training intensity and the size distribution in the 
economy. Therefore, we are confident that our results are not driven simply by the sector 
composition within countries or to the cross country variation in institutions. Rather with 
our reduced form, our findings will be driven by comparing differences across firms in 
the  training  intensity  within  the  same  country  and  detailed  (3-digit  ISIC)  sector  of 
activity. This decision reflects the fact that both firm size and the intensity to train (as 
well as the several dimensions of the business environment that we will explore in next 
section) have substantial variation within countries and sectors. Moreover, controlling for 
a set of interaction dummies by country and sector also accounts for potential omitted 
variables and possible measurement errors across countries. 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
4.1. Main Results  
Table 3 reports the point estimates for the different variables in equation (2). The 
specifications across different columns differ in the controls included. In column (1) we 
just control for firm size and country dummies, in column (2) we add a proxy for the 
degree of firm openness (dummy variable for whether firm exports and has some foreign 
owned capital), age of the firm, public ownership and share of skilled workers in the 
workforce. Column (3) includes in addition to the variables in column (2) a proxy for 
technological innovation and column (4) includes country-city fixed effects.
16  
The findings in column (1) show that there is a statistically significant and quantitatively 
important positive correlation between the  investment in job training and firm size. In 
particular, small, medium and large firms are 16.1, 36.7 and 49.0 percentage points more 
likely to invest in job training   than micro firms, respectively. These  differences  are 
slightly reduced, although remain quantitatively important and statistically significant, as 
across  columns,  we  include  additional  control  variables,  like  firm  observable 
characteristics  in  columns  (2)  and  (3)  and  country-city  and  sector  unobservable 
characteristics, in column (4). 
                                                 
16 The Enterprise Surveys report information on whether the firm is located in the capital city or in cities 
with more than 1 million workers. The country-city fixed effects include in column (4) of table 3 are the 
interaction of this city dummy with the country dummies. This specification also controls for sector 3 digit 
fixed effects.    16 
One reason why larger firms could be more likely to train their workers in column (1) 
could relate to their larger integration into global markets (both through exports and FDI) 
or through differences in the shares of capital publically owned, age of the firm, or in the 
education of the workforce. Moreover, larger firms are also more likely to invest in new 
technology than smaller firms and this could also lead them to invest more in job training.  
The findings in columns (2) and (3) of table 3 show that, although the investment in job 
training is complementary to the skills of the workforce, with the degree of openness and 
with  technological  innovation,  the  magnitude  and  statistically  significance  of  the  job 
training  premium  is  important  after  controlling  for  differences  across  firms  in  these 
characteristics.  
Large firms could also systematically differ in their intensity to train due to their 
geographical location. We conjecture that firms located outside the capital city or in very 
large cities (with more than 1 million inhabitants) could benefit from more developed 
institutions or to worse access to information than firms located in larger cities (even 
within the same country). To the extent that small firms disproportionally locate outside 
the capital city, as we actually see in our sample, the firm‟s regional location could be 
partly driving the differences across small and large firms in their training intensity. The 
findings  in  column  (4)  of  table  3  control  for  these  within  country  differences. 
Reassuringly, the point estimates in column (4) are almost unchanged from the column 
(3). Therefore, we will take the specification in column (3) as our baseline specification.  
Table A4 in  the appendix tests  the robustness of the findings  reported in  table 3 by 
exploring alternative proxies for the stock of human capital of the workforce and for the 
degree of innovation and technological adoption. In column (1) we add to the baseline 
specification  reported  in  column  (3)  of  table  3  the  mean  years  of  schooling  of  the 
workforce, in column (2) we add to the baseline specification the share of investment in 
R&D as a share of total sales, in column (3) we add to the baseline specification whether 
the firm has an International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification and in 
column  (4)  we  add  over  the  baseline  specification  the  firm  capacity  utilization. 
Reassuringly  the  point  estimates  associated  with  the  different  firm  sizes  remain 
quantitatively similar and statistically significant.   17 
Interesting to discuss are also the signs of the estimates for the control variables in 
table 3. First, the findings suggest a strong complementarity between the investment in 
job training of the workforce and the stock of human capital of the workforce, measured 
by the share of skilled workers in the firm. This finding is supportive of the idea that, the 
more educated is the workforce in the firm, the higher is the return to this investment, 
regardless  of  firm  size.  This  is  fully  aligned  with  the  empirical  evidence  exploring 
household level surveys where more educated workers have higher returns and are more 
likely  to  receive  job  training  than  less  educated  workers  (see  e.g.,  Tan  and  Lopez-
Acevedo, 2003, Johansen and Van Adams, 2004). Second, the findings also suggest a 
strong complementarity between the investment in job training and the degree of firm 
openness, on the one hand and between the investment in job training and technological 
adoption on the other hand (see e.g. Bee and Batra, 1998).
17 Third, we do not find strong 
support of the view that all else constant older and publically owned firms are more likely 
to invest in job training.  
  Table 4 tests whether the positive correlation across firm size and the investment 
in job training is driven by other factors related with the firm geographical location and 
the sector of activity. First, we test whether within each country, the positive correlation 
across firm size and the investment in job training could be driven by the fact that larger 
firms disproportionally locate in the country capital or in other very large cities.
18 And, 
we conjecture that firms located in the capital or in large cities could have better 
institutions, a better access to information on the quality of trainings or possibly face 
lower training costs, due to the proximity to training centers. Therefore, larger firms 
could be, all else constant, more likely to invest in on the job training simply because of 
their geographical location. Column (1) of table 4 reports the estimates for the baseline 
specification when restricting the sample only to firms located outside the capital city. 
                                                 
17 It is also interesting to note that, in column (3) of table 3, the positive correlation between the investment 
in job training on the one hand and the degree of firm openness on the other hand is not solely explained by 
differences across firms in their technological innovation. Notice that these point estimates are still large 
and statistically  significant in columns (3) and (4) after controlling for differences across firms in the 
degree of technological adoption.  
18 In particular, in our sample 40% of the micro and 45% of the small fi rms are located in the capital or in 
other very large city, while 50% for the large firms are located there.   18 
Reassuringly the point estimates remain positive and statistically strong than the ones 
reported in column (3) of table 3.  
We  investigate  next,  whether  the  positive  correlation  between  firm  size  and  the 
investment in job training could be driven by the sector of activity. This is plausible since 
small and large firms are likely to differ in the technology use, which in turn is also likely 
to  determine  the  demand  for  investing  in  job  training.  Even  though  in  the  baseline 
specification reported in column (3) of table 3, we already control for differences across 
firms in the sector of activity (with country-sector dummies) it is possible that the returns 
to the investment are different by sector of activity. If the latter holds, we would expect 
the results to be different across different samples with differing technologies, levels of 
technological adoption and/or capital/labor rations. Moreover, since in our sample micro 
and  small  firms  are  more  concentrated  in  non-manufacturing  sectors,  this  sector 
composition could also be driving the results.
 19 Column (2) reports the findings for the 
baseline specification when restricting the sample only to manufacturing firms, which 
account for 73% of the sample. Reassuringly the magnitude and significance of the point 
estimates are almost not affected. In columns (3) and (4) we also analyze whether our 
findings are systematically different across low-tech and high-tech sectors, respectively.
20 
In our sample, the low-tech manufacturing sectors have a larger share of  smaller firms 
than the high –tech sectors, probably due to the large fixed costs of starting up high-tech 
activities.  Reassuringly,  restricting  the  sample  across  these  two  groups  still  yields 
quantitatively large and statistical significant differences in the intensity to train across 
firm sizes in the two the manufacturing sectors. However, the point estimates in columns 
(3)  and  (4)  show  that  the  differences  across  firm  sizes  are  slightly  larger  for  firms 
operating in the low-tech sectors than for those firms in the high –tech sectors. Finally, 
one could argue that the differences across firms in the technology used are still not 
adequately  captured by  the sector composition  of firms.  In particular, there is  robust 
                                                 
19 We also worry more with the possible non-representativeness of the Enterprise Surveys in the non-
manufacturing  sectors than  for the  manufacturing sectors. Moreover, in  most countries, the  Enterprise 
Surveys do not cover so exhaustively the non-manufacturing sectors.   
20 We follow Parisi et al (2006) and consider high technology manufacturing sectors the following 3-digit 
ISIC  sectors:  Auto  or  Auto-component,  Chemical  and  Pharmaceutical,  Electronics  or  Metals  and 
Machinery industries. The low technology manufacturing sectors are the Beverages, Food, Garment and 
Leather, Non-metallic/Plastic Materials, Wood and Paper, Textiles.    19 
evidence  that  there  is  wide  dispersion  in  productivity  even  within  narrowly  defined 
sectors (e.g., Eslava et al. 2004; Foster, Haltiwanger; and Syverson, 2008), so that the 
returns to the investment in job training could be more directly related to the stock of 
physical capital. We test the robustness of our baseline specification to controlling for 
differences  across  firms  in  the  capital  intensity  of  their  technology  (captured  by  the 
capital labor ratio). The findings, reported in column (5) of table A4 again show that the 
main coefficients of interest remain robust.
21 Also interestingly, our findings do not differ 
significantly if we were to break the sample by the  age cohort of firms (not reported but 
available upon request). The latter is suggestive that the differences across small and 
large firms in the intensity to train are also not explained by the fact that larger firms tend 
to be on average older.    
 
4.2. Heterogeneity Around the Developing World 
In this section we discuss whether the positive correlation across firm size and the 
investment in job training holds across different geographical regions of the world and 
income  levels.  We  discussed  in  section  2  that  there  is  a  large  heterogeneity  in  the 
intensity to provide job training across countries and regions of the world. Table A1 in 
the appendix shows that firms operating in Africa or in South Asia have a lower share of 
firms offering job training than firms located elsewhere. In particular, a firm in Thailand 
or in Brazil is, on average, more than four times more likely to offer job training than a 
firm  in  Mozambique  or  in  Gambia.  Table  3  showed  that  some  of  this  variation  is 
explained  by  differences  in  the  observable  characteristics  of  firms  across  countries. 
However, there is still a large unexplained variation related with the firm‟s geographical 
location.
22  
Table  5  reports  the  baseline  specification  when  restricting  the  sample  to  firms 
operating in Africa in column (1), in East Asia in column (2), in Eastern Central Europe 
                                                 
21  The  robustness  of  our  results  reported  in  table  A4  in  the  appendix  is  reassuring  but  some  of  the 
specifications have significantly less observations than our baseline specification because some measures 
have not been consistently collected across all countries.  
22 Running a regression of training intensity in firm size, not accounting for country fixed effects, yields an 
R-squared of 0.09 and larger point estimates than the ones reported in column (1) of table 3. In particular 
we find that small, medium and large firms are 17.3, 38.3 and 48.4 percentage points more likely to train 
than micro firms. Thus, differences across firms in their ge ographical location explain approximately half 
of the observed variation in training intensity across firm size.   20 
in  column (3), in  Latin America in  column (4), in Middle East  and  North  Africa in 
column (5) and in South Asia in column (6). Firms operating within each of  these broad 
regions of the world have arguably a more similar institutional environment, including 
the  cultural  and  socio-economic  characteristics.  In  particular,  we  are  interested  in 
understanding how the results could be driven by the specific training policy for the 
manufacturing sector in  Africa. The importance of the apprenticeships  particularly in 
West Africa has been well documented and is predominant among smaller firms (see e.g. 
Frazer, 2006, Bas, 1989 or Velenchik, 1985).
23 Even though we believe that this type of 
more informal training schemes is outside the scope of our data, it is important to test the 
extent to which results could be driven by these institutional differences across regions.
24 
Again, our point estimates show quantitatively important differences across all regions of 
the world.  Two facts are worth highlighting, though. First, differences in the intensity to 
train for Africa and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA henceforth) are slightly 
larger  than  those  in  our  baseline  specification.   In  particular,  larger  firms  are  47 
percentage points and 45.7 percentage points more likely to train than micro firms 
(omitted category) in Africa and MENA. These are regions wer e training intensity is, 
according to our sample, one of the lowest in the world.  Second, East Asia is the region 
of the world with smaller dispersion across firm size s. There small, medium and large 
firms are 6.8, 23.6 and 32.1 percentage points more like ly to train than micro firms,  
respectively.   
Finally, table  6  analyzes the heterogeneity of the main  findings  by  the  country‟s 
income level. Column (1) reports the baseline specification for firms operating in low 
income countries, column (2) for firms in middle-low and column (3) in middle-high 
income countries.
  25 Interestingly, the point estimates still show statistically significant 
                                                 
23 Frazer (2006) describes that apprenticeships are periods of approximately three years during which an 
apprentice learns a trade. At the end of this period, the apprentice may be hired by the firm where the 
apprenticeship took place, or start a job elsewhere (including self-employment). Apprenticeships occur 
most often, but not exclusively, in smaller firms, and the master is often the owner of the firm. 
24  Apprentenships are often criticized for offering informal training methods and lacking theoretical 
foundations that are needed in the complex technical demands of the formal sector. The main advantages 
are that it is not government funded (with  cost being borne by the apprentice and/or firm) and that they 
provide an option for youth who would otherwise be unemployed.  
25  The group of middle-high income countries include: Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Oman, Poland, Russia, 
Slovakia and South Africa.    21 
and quantitatively important differences in the intensity to train by firm size, across all 
income  levels.  However,  when  comparing  the  results  to  the  baseline  specification 
reported in table 3 for all income groups, we find that the dispersion in training associated 
with larger firms is greater for low income countries, and the one associated with for 
small and medium sized firms is greater for middle-high income countries.  
Our findings in tables 3, 4 and 5 show that large firms provide less on-the-job training 
than smaller firms around the developing world and that quantitatively the differences are 
important. The findings also show that these differences in training intensity across firm 
sizes are not fully explained by differences across firms in their average human capital of 
the workforce, the degree of firm openness and technological adoption. Moreover, they 
are also prevalent across all regions of the world and income levels, although differences 
tend to be larger for firms operating in low-tech sectors, in regions with overall lower 
incidences and in low income countries.  
One point is still worth highlighting. Even though we estimate a strong and positive 
differential in the intensity to train across firm sizes, we will not be able to ultimately 
disentangle  correlation  from  causality.  In  particular,  it  is  possible  that  the  positive 
coefficients are driven by reverse causality where firm size is a leading indicator – not a 
causal indicator – of the firm‟s investment in job training.  We argue that the precise 
question  in  the  survey  is  likely  to  mitigate  this  problem  as  it  recalls  information  on 
training incidence over the last two years while the information on firm size refers only to 
the  previous  year.  Furthermore,  it  is  reassuring  to  see  that  the  differential  in  the 
investment in job training across firm sizes is robust to several cuts in our sample, as well 
as to the control of several observable and unobservable characteristics, like the degree of 
firm openness and technological adoption, the skills of the workforce or country-sector 
unobservable characteristics. Nevertheless, most likely the investment in job training will 
be linked to higher firm productivity and possibly also with more employment. One way 
to mitigate this problem is to control for the initial firm size, hoping that employment 
growth is more likely to be a more exogenous variable. Unfortunately we do not have a 
good reason to justify this nor is this information available in our data set.  
 
5.  Why do SMEs Invest Less in Job Training?   22 
5.1. Reasons Behind Differences   
The  relevant  policy  question  is  thus,  what  prevents  SMEs  from  engaging  in  this 
investment and how could policies be better designed to foster this investment. In some 
countries,  the  Enterprise  Surveys  collected  some  additional  information  on  the  main 
reasons why firms do not offer job training.
26 Unfortunately, this information is collected 
for a much smaller set of countries and is subjective (self -reported) which prevents us 
from using it in our empirical analysis. Figures 2 through  5 report this information for 
Brazil, China and a set of Central American countries, respectively. T he three most 
important reasons for not offering job training relate to managers thinking that  informal 
training (e.g., through learning by doing) is enough investment to foster productivity, the 
possibility to hire trained workers from other firms (or the poaching of workers) and the 
lack  of  financing  opportunities.  Nevertheless,  these  factors  are  the  most  important 
irrespective of firm size. This anecdotal evidence also shows that small firms are more 
likely to  report the  poaching of workers/labor turnover, the lack of knowledge or  the 
skepticism about training effectiveness and lack of access to finance  than larger firms. 
Lack of financing comes up as a more important reason not to offer job training for 
smaller firms than in larger firms in Central America and in Sri Lanka. Also, larger firms 
are less likely to report lack of knowledge or no need for offering  job  training than 
smaller firms.  
Even though this evidence is interesting, it is  subjective and self reported by those 
firms not engaging in job training, thus making it difficult to explore as a reliable source 
of information on the different types of market failures  facing all firms. In this section, 
we will explore the richness in our data set to obtain  measurable proxies of the market 
imperfections impeding this investment. We consider  the role of alternative factors 
discussed above and related with  the firm‟s access to information, the access to firm 
                                                 
26 The exact question posed is differs slightly across countries and for countries in Central America is: “If 
your plant does not to offer formal training (neither internal or external), please indicate the three principal 
reasons for not doing so?” (1) New workers become proficient in the job through learning  by doing; (2) In-
house  training  is  considered  adequate;  (3)  Lack  knowledge  about  training  techniques  and  training 
programs; (4) Training is not affordable due to my firm's limited resources; (5) Skilled workers can be 
readily  hired  from  other  firms;  (6)  Skills  that  workers  learn  in  school  are  adequate  to  our  needs;  (7) 
Skeptical about the benefits of training and (8) Training is costly because of high labor turnover. Based on 
this set of options, we have created a dummy variables.   23 
external finance or the perceived uncertainty in the returns. The empirical work in this 
section will try to isolate the importance of each of these factors.  
First, SMEs could be less likely to provide on the job training if the expected rate of 
return is smaller for SMEs than for larger firms (and this return is, in turn, below the 
return  on  alternative  investments  like  the  investment  in  physical  capital).  One  could 
conjecture different reasons why this could happen. On the one hand, SMEs could face a 
lower return because the expected benefits of this investment (ultimately translating into 
higher productivity) are smaller for SMEs than for larger firms. The higher returns for 
SMEs could relate to the complementarity of the investment in job training with stock if 
human capital of the workforce, which could be higher (or less heterogeneous) among 
larger firms. To the extent that the workforce in small firms is on average less educated, 
or has  a more heterogeneous  human capital  composition  than the workforce in  large 
firms, the lower investment could simply be driven by the lack of complementary inputs. 
The same argument could be done regarding the complementarity of the investment in 
job training on the one hand and the investment in new technologies or in R&D, on the 
other. To the extent that these activities are less common among small firms than in large 
firms (as documented by Almeida and Fernandes, 2008 and De Mel et al, 2009) this 
would also lead to a smaller investment in job training among smaller firms.  
Alternatively, one could conjecture that the expected return of the investment is smaller 
among SMEs because smaller firms have, on average, a smaller time horizon to recover 
this investment than larger firms.  This could happen if on average labor turnover is 
higher among SMEs due to their contractual arrangements. Finally, the returns to the 
investment in job training could be smaller in small firms if there are large fixed costs of 
training. In this case the marginal cost of investing in job training will be smaller in larger 
firms leading to a higher expected marginal return of this investment.
27 Almeida and 
Carneiro (2009) argue that the foregone productivity cost of training accounts for only 
                                                 
27 The total marginal cost of the investment in job training is a function of the direct cost of training and on 
the foregone productivity cost of training. There are few data sets with information on the direct costs of 
training (e.g., training materials). Almeida and Carneiro (2009) are one exception. They find that this is a 
more important component of the total marginal costs than the foregone productivity (which they proxy by 
the marginal product of worker‟s time).   24 
25% of the total costs of training and that the direct costs of training (related to the set up 
costs  of  acquiring  training  materials  or  hiring  training  faculty)  are  a  more  important 
component  of  total  costs.  Unfortunately,  there  is  little  empirical  evidence  on  the 
magnitude of the training costs both for developed and developing countries mostly due 
to the lack of data (Machin and Vignoles, 2001).  
Second, smaller firms could be less likely to invest in job training if they lack the 
needed financial resources to invest, in spite of the possibly large expected returns. This 
could happen if small firms are less profitable or more credit constrained than larger 
firms. There is a large literature on differences across firms in access to external finance.  
For example, Beck et al, (2005) show that smaller firms finance a lower proportion of 
their  overall  investment  externally,  because  they  make  smaller  use  of  external  bank 
finance.    They  also  find  that  in  countries  with  better  property  rights,  small  firms 
disproportionally  resort  more  to  more  external  finance.  These  results  underline  the 
importance of improving the institutional environment for increasing the access of small 
firms to external finance.
28  
Finally, SMEs might face larger informational asymmetries and more uncertainty 
regarding the returns of the investment, in spite of possibly large ex-post returns. These 
problems could arise if small firms have less access to information than larger firms due, 
for example, to the lower human capital/experience of their management or due to a more 
remote  location  (where  information  flows  less  fluently).  Moreover,  SMEs  could 
disproportionally face more uncertainty on the quality (or availability) of the investment 
in job training than large firms. For example, if in countries with a larger SME sector 
there is also more economic uncertainty or lower quality of institutions, it will be more 
difficult for firms to access the return of the invest in human capital. This could yield a 
negative  correlation  between  firm  size  and  the  investment  in  human  capital.  Finally, 
SMEs could also face larger coordination problems across firms and workers (see e.g., 
Pischke, 2005) making it more difficult to invest in job training. Since the benefits of 
training need to be shared between firms and workers, if there are coordination problems, 
                                                 
28 They also find that informal financing does little to relax financial constraints faced by small firms in 
developing economies. Moreover, small  firms do not  use disproportionately  use  more leasing or trade 
finance compared to larger firms.   25 
each  party  individually  might  only  see  part  of  the  total  benefit  of  training.    And 
investment decisions could be less coordinated among SMEs. Alternatively this could 
also be due to the “poaching externality” (Stevens, 1994).  
 
5.2. Empirical Evidence  
  We investigate next the extent to which the lower intensity to train among SMEs 
could be driven by each of the reasons discussed above. In particular we take proxies in 
our data set to measure the extent to which firms differ in the magnitude of the returns to 
the  investment  or  if  there  is  any  evidence  of  market  failures  related  with  lack  of 
information,  difficulties  in  coordination,  restricted  access  to  finance  or  economic 
uncertainty. The findings are reported in columns (1) through (7) of table 7. For ease in 
comparing, we replicate our baseline specification (in column (3) of table 3) in column 
(1) of table 7.  
  First we conjecture that SMEs could have a reduced access to information on 
available training programs and their quality than larger firms. This could be driven by 
SMEs having a more remote location relatively to the city center than larger firms or due 
to lower human capital of their management. Reassuringly, our findings are robust to 
controlling for within country differences in firm location (as discussed in column (4) of 
table 3). Moreover, the magnitude of the point estimates remains very close even after 
excluding from our sample those firms in the capital city, with arguable better access to 
information (in column (1) of table 4). Furthermore, we also assume that the level of 
education of the manager is much correlated with the set of information available to the 
firm and test the robustness of the results to controlling for differences across firms in 
managerial education. In column (2) of table 7 we report the results of estimating the 
baseline specification (in column 3 of table 3) augmented with a dummy variable that 
equals one when the manager has received tertiary education. Although smaller, the point 
estimates are still quantitatively important and statistically significant.
29   
  Second, we investigate whether the  differences in training i ntensity could be 
driven by differences across firms in how easy is the coordination of this investment with 
                                                 
29 The smaller point estimates are in part also explained by the lack of data on the managers‟ education for 
several countries. Replicating our baseline specification in column (1) but for the sample of countries in 
column (2) would yield coefficients for small, medium and large firms of 10.3, 30.6 and 38.3, respectively.    26 
their workers or in the time during which firms can on average recover this investment in 
the human capital of their workers. In column (3), we proxy the flexibility in the firm‟s 
contractual arrangements with the share of the workforce with temporary contracts. In 
column (4), we proxy the difficulties in coordination between workers and firms with the 
share of the workforce that is unionized. The sign of the point estimates on temporary 
contracts is not clear cut, though. On the one hand, firms resorting more to the use of 
temporary contracts could have a lower incentive to invest in job training if employers 
face a smaller horizon to recover this investment. On the other hand, temporary contracts 
could  serve  as  a  stepping  stone  to  hire  workers  into  permanent  contracts.  Therefore, 
employers might take the period of the temporary contract to train workers and thus be 
able to screen their worker‟s performance and unveil their quality while performing on 
the  job.  Empirical  evidence  exploring  individual  level  data  has  been  found  on  both 
directions (see e.g., Arulampalam and Booth, 1998, or Autor, 2004).
30 Our findings in 
columns (3) and (4) of table 7 show that the positive correlation in training intensity and 
firm size are almost unchanged relatively to the ones reported in column (1). In these two 
specifications, the point estimates for medium and large firms increase slightly relatively 
to the baseline specification, suggesting that differences across small and large firms in 
the share of both temporary contracts and unionization, contribute to smaller correlations 
in the intensity to train and firm size. Also, interestingly, we find that there is a very small 
but positive correlation between job training on the one hand, and the use of temporary 
contracts and the share of unionized workers on the other . This finding is supportive of 
the  view  that  temporary  contracts  at  the  firm  level  could  be  used  as  a  screening 
mechanism to access  worker quality  and  productivity  (see Autor,  2004).  It is also  
supportive of the view that unions could play a role in helping workers obtain a share of 
the  training  benefits  (when  training  is  firm  specific),   and  thus  avoiding  poaching 
                                                 
30 Most of the literature looking at this topic for developed countries has found that temporary workers 
receive less job training than permanent workers although the effects are small (see e.g., Bassanini et al, 
2005).  Almeida  and  Aterido  (2008)  tackle  a  related  topic  of  how  training  intensity  differs  with  the 
enforcement of country labor code. They find that reforms in the labor code that simultaneously accelerate 
the  flexibility  in  hiring  (through  fewer  hiring  regulations  and  more  flexible  working  schedules)  and 
increase the protection of permanent workers tend to generate negative effects on the on the investment in 
human capital by firms.    27 
problems.
31  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the point estimates for the se two 
variables are very small, suggesting that they have a small explanatory power when 
comparing incidence across firms operating within the same cou ntry, city and detailed 
sector of activity.
32  
  Third, we investigate whether  the positive correlation could be driven by SMEs 
being less profitable or having a lower access to external finance than larger firms. In our 
data we observe the share of reinvested profits and the access to external finance and see 
that SMEs have lower shares of reinvested profits and also lower access to finance .
33 
Both firm-level and industry-level studies suggest that small firms do relatively better 
compared to large firms in countries with better-developed financial institutions (see e.g., 
Beck et al, 2008).
34 The point estimates in column (5) and (6) of table 7 shows that the 
positive correlations in the intensity to train and the firm size are robust to controlling for 
these differences across firms.  Moreover, we always find a robust positive correlation 
between incidence of job training on the one hand and the share of reinvested profits and 
access to external finance on the other.  This finding shows that improving the access to 
finance matters to foster the investment in human capital  independently of firm size. 
Moreover,  controlling  for  the se  differences  in  columns  (5)  and  (6)  leaves  almost 
unchanged the differences cross small and large firms in the intensity to train reported in 
column (1).  
Finally, we investigate whether SMEs are less likely to invest in job  training due 
to the greater uncertainty on the quality of the investment in job training and thus on the 
                                                 
31 In theory, the effect of trade unions on job training depends on whether the effect is through the wage 
structure (where more unionization leads to higher wages and arguable lower investments) or through the 
direct negotiation of training. Booth et al(2003) and Bassanini et al (2005) discuss this in detail. The 
empirical work has also found mixed results. Our findings are in line with Lynch and Black, (1998), Green 
and Lemieux (2007) who find almost no link between unions and the provision of job training. 
32 The surveys also collect information that allow us to compute labor turnover.  However, the sample size 
falls dramatically, invalidating the comparison with a broader sample. As with the share of temporary 
contracts the evidence is supportive of firms facing higher turnover also investing more.   
33 We  measure access to external finance with a  dummy variable equal to one when the firm reports 
financing  its  working  capital  with  bank  loans  and  overdrafts  at  commercial  banks  or  wit h  leasing 
arrangements. 
34 With financial development, small firms grow faster since their financing constraints are relaxed to a 
greater extent.  Furthermore, industrial sectors that naturally should have a disproportionately large number 
of small firms also grow faster with greater financial development, suggesting that it is the small firms that 
benefit the most.    28 
returns. If uncertainty is a problem hitting particularly micro and small firms, then these 
could be less likely to invest in spite of the potentially large ex-post returns. To account 
for differences across firms in economic uncertainty, we follow Aterido et al (2011) and 
explore  information  on  how  managers  rank  the  importance  of  the  uncertainty  in  the 
economic and regulatory policy relatively to other obstacles.
35 Our prior is that for firms 
reporting that economic uncertainty is more of an obstacle than other factors, they will be 
less likely to invest in job training. And, because firms differ significantly in the level of 
perception on how important  these different economic factors are, we  also control for 
differences across firms in the a group of indicators (including  perceptions regarding the 
economic  and  r egulatory  policy  uncertainty,  macroeconomic  instability,  corruption, 
crime, theft and disorder,  anti-competitive or informal practices,  legal system/conflict 
resolution).  Column (7) reports the results of this regression. Reassuringly the point 
estimates remain very similar to the ones reported in column (1). Again this suggests that 
although  facing  higher  levels  of  economic  uncertainty  seems  to  matters  for  this 
investment, this does not disproportionally explain why SMEs train less than larger firms.  
A possible concern with the findings in table 7 relates to the potential endogeneity 
of the explanatory variables in columns (2) through (7). If the investment in job training 
within the firm leads to higher employment growth as well as to greater access to finance, 
or to  a  greater share of reinvested profits , then the point estimates could be biased 
upwards. We follow Aterido et al (2011)  and construct proxies for each of the  factors 
discussed in table 7 but based instead on the responses of the  average firm located in the 
same country, location, sector and size cell (excluding the observation related to the own 
firm).
36 Matching the mean response for each firm is a two step approach. To illustrate, 
                                                 
35 The exact question in the Enterprise Surveys is “Please tell us if any of the following issues are a 
problem  for the operation and growth of  your business. If an issue poses a problem,  please judge its 
severity as an obstacle on a four-point scale: Telecommunications,  Electricity, Transportation, Access to 
Land,  Tax  rates,    Tax  administration,  Customs  and  Trade  Regulations,  Labor  Regulations,  Skills  and 
Education of Available Workers, Business Licensing and Operating Permits, Access to Financing, Cost of 
Financing, Economic and Regulatory Policy Uncertainty,  Macroeconomic Instability, Corruption, Crime, 
theft and disorder, Anti-competitive or informal practices, Legal system/conflict resolution. Rankings vary 
between 1 and 5. Some papers have explored this information to relate levels in perceptions with firm 
performance (e.g., Ayyagari et al. 2008; Beck et al. 2005; Pierre and Scarpetta 2006).  
36 To ensure adequate numbers of firms in each cell average  we drop one dimension of the cell until  an 
adequate number is reached ,  i.e. first  substituting by  country-location-size  averages, then  by  country-
sector-size averages, etc. Aterido (2011) also explore this approach.    29 
take the information that firms report about access to credit. First, when constructing the 
mean access to finance at the country-location-sector-size average we use as measure of 
firm size the firm„s average size (between period t-3 and t) rather than the current firm 
size.  The  latter  is  arguably  more  exogenous  to  the  firm‟s  current  investment  in  job 
training  than  the  former  (especially  if  we  worry  with  reverse  causality).  Second,  we 
match the averaged indicators to each firm based on the firm initial size, not the current 
size. We estimate the same model as the one reported in table 7 but based on these 
variables and report the findings in table A5. It is reassuring to see that the relation 
between the investment  in  job training and each measure of market  imperfection  are 
qualitatively very similar than the ones in table 7. The main differences relate with the 
lack of statistical significance of one of the variables proxing access to capital (share of 
reinvested  profits)  and  with  the  variable  proxying  the  perceived  uncertainty  of  the 
economic environment. 
37    
 
6.  Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The importance of the SME sector for growth in the developing world is consensual and 
policymakers all over the world worry with how to foster productivity and growth among 
this group of firms. Moreover, in a modern economy, the investment in human capital is 
crucial to foster technological adoption and, thus, achieve higher productivity growth.  
This paper explores a unique firm level data set across 99 countries in the developing 
world to (1) document how different are the propensities to invest in job training across 
firm  sizes;  and  to  (2)  investigate  the  reasons  behind  the  large  differences  in  the 
investment in job training. We conjecture that SMEs could be less likely to invest in job 
training because of three broad set of reasons. First, the expected return on the investment 
in job training might be smaller for SMEs. This could happen if either SMEs have lower 
expected benefits or higher marginal costs of the investment in job training. Second, 
                                                 
37 We have also tested the robustness of our findings by averaging the responses of firms: (1) Considering 
the current firm size (instead of the initial size); (2) Excluding the size dimension (i.e., computing means by 
country,  sector  and  location).  Reassuringly  the  results  (not  reported  but  available  on  request)  are 
supportinve of the low explanatory power of the proposed variables in explaining the large training gaps 
across firm size within countries and sectors. Moreover, the qualitative results for each of the proposed 
explanatory variables remains very similar to the ones reported in table 7.  
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Second, SMEs could be more likely to lack the financial resources to invest, in spite of 
the possibly large expected returns of investing. Third, in spite of a possibly large average 
returns, SMEs could have worse access to information, face greater uncertainty regarding 
the returns of this investment or have larger coordination problems with their workers 
than larger firms.  
Our findings show that a strong and positive correlation across the investment in job 
training  and  firm  size  is  a  robust  empirical  finding  within  and  across  countries  with 
different institutions and income levels. However, our data does not support the view that 
the difference in investment in job training across firm size is mostly explained by market 
imperfections and institutional failures impeding SME development. Rather, they most 
likely point to the smaller expected returns from this investment. Therefore, our findings 
call for some caution when designing pro-SME policies tackling these imperfections with 
the ultimate objective of abolish this gap. Simply from an efficiency perspective, a pro-
SME intervention in this market is not necessarily needed or desirable.  
Finally,  our  findings  are supportive of  policy interventions  improving  the general 
access to information and external finance, the coordination between firms and workers 
and mitigating the uncertainty in the investment climate producing positive effects on 
training incidence in the developing world. Moreover, institutional and policy reforms 
fostering the integration of firms in the global markets and leading to more technological 
innovations  should  also  foster  the  investment  in  job  training  across  all  firm  sizes. 
However, we do not find much support that this type of interventions will significantly 
improve the incentives to invest among SMEs relatively to larger firms.   
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N Mean S.D. Min Max
Share of Firms Training  48,580 0.396 0.489 0 1
Small Firms  47,612 0.37 0.48 0 1
Medium Firms  47,612 0.22 0.41 0 1
Large Firms  47,612 0.12 0.32 0 1
Age of the Firm  46,325 16.5 15.9 1 193
Capital City Dummy 42,653 0.515 0.500 0 1
Public Ownership 47,043 0.054 0.227 0 1
Exporter 47,984 0.246 0.431 0 1
Foreign Ownership  47,269 0.119 0.323 0 1
Technological Innovation 34,478 0.544 0.498 0 1
R&D Intensity  21,067 0.273 0.446 0 1
ISO Technlogical Certification 29,021 0.191 0.393 0 1
Managerial Terciary Education 18,818 0.728 0.445 0 1
Share Skilled Workers  38,743 0.708 0.291 0 1
Av. Years Education Workforce 30,897 7.720 3.401 0 14
High Technology Industries  48,376 0.233 0.423 0 1
Access to Finance  43,703 0.650 0.477 0 1
Capacity Utilization  40,405 72.826 22.079 0 100
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: Table reports summary statistics of the main variables in the paper. All the variables are defined in table A2 in the appendix. Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, by Training Intensity
Training Firms  Non-Training Firms 
Number of Firms  19,260 29,320
Micro  0.15 0.39
Small  0.33 0.40
Medium   0.28 0.14
Large  0.13 0.04
Foreign Ownership  0.18 0.08
Public Ownership  0.09 0.03
Age Firm  18.62 15.06
Share of Skilled Workers  0.68 0.73
Managerial Terciary Education  0.82 0.64
Technology Adoption  0.65 0.45
Investment R&D  0.38 0.18
ISO Technlogical Certification  0.32 0.09
Value added per employee (log)  2.14 1.48
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: Table reports characteristics of firms by training intensity. All the variables are definied in Table A.2. in the
appendix. Table 3: Determinants of Size-Job Training Differential: Role of Skills and Technological Complementarities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small Firms 0.171 0.164 0.144 0.136
[0.0120]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0114]*** [0.0143]***
Medium Firms  0.378 0.359 0.328 0.317
[0.0198]*** [0.0130]*** [0.0148]*** [0.0184]***
Large Firms 0.498 0.468 0.421 0.412
[0.0270]*** [0.0137]*** [0.0157]*** [0.0207]***
Openness - 0.114 0.104 0.0968
[0.00765]*** [0.00870]*** [0.00905]***
Age of the Firm (Log) - 0.00377 0.00432 0.00409
[0.00445] [0.00499] [0.00505]
Public Ownership - 0.006 0.0034 -0.00289
[0.0167] [0.0177] [0.0283]
Share of Skilled Workers  - 0.101 0.0854 0.078
[0.0138]*** [0.0146]*** [0.0169]***
Technological Innnovation - - 0.173 0.172
[0.00800]*** [0.00963]***
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes  No  No  No 
Country-Sector Fixed Effects?  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Country -City-Sector Fixed Effects?  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations 47,612 35,644 29,644 29,817
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is a dummy variable
that equals 1 when the firm reports providing on the job training. Standard errors are clustered at the country and
sector level. Column (1) includes country fixed effects, column (2) includes country and sector interactions and
column (4) includes country-sector and city interactions. We consider 3 city categories - capital cities and those
with a population above one million, and cities below 1 million people. Column (1) includes size dummies;
column (2) includes in addition to the variables in column (1), firm openness, log age of the firm, the share of
capital owned by public sources and the share of skilled workers in the firm. Column (3) adds a technological
innovation dummy and column (4) replicates column (3) but controlling for country-city-sector dummies. We
refer to the specification in column (3) of this table as the baseline specification. All the variables are defined in




Firms Manufacturig  Firms Low Tech 
Manufacturing 
Firms High Tech 
Manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Small Firms 0.138 0.131 0.13 0.124
[0.0144]*** [0.0188]*** [0.0199]*** [0.0379]***
Medium Firms  0.344 0.326 0.335 0.301
[0.0185]*** [0.0229]*** [0.0270]*** [0.0389]***
Large Firms 0.462 0.417 0.438 0.372
[0.0174]*** [0.0222]*** [0.0257]*** [0.0366]***
Baseline Specification?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 16,774 17,772 11,665 6,045
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that
equals 1 when the firm reports providing on the job training. Standard errors are clustered at the country and sector level.
Columns (1) through (4) report the results of estimating the baseline specification - reported in column (3) of table 3 - for
different samples. Column (1) considers only firms located outside the capital city, column (2) considers only
manufacturing firms, column (3) considers only low-tech firms and column (4) considers only high-tech firms All the
variables are defined in Table A.2. in the appendix. Table 5: The Size-Job Training Differential: Heterogenity Around the Developing World




Middle East and 
North Africa
South Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Small Firms 0.0987 0.0683 0.202 0.147 0.0996 0.113
[0.0247]*** [0.0366]* [0.0236]*** [0.0141]*** [0.0227]*** [0.0208]***
Medium Firms  0.292 0.236 0.325 0.367 0.202 0.268
[0.0424]*** [0.0392]*** [0.0254]*** [0.0187]*** [0.0415]*** [0.0336]***
Large Firms 0.47 0.321 0.393 0.423 0.458 0.409
[0.0569]*** [0.0374]*** [0.0290]*** [0.0157]*** [0.0526]*** [0.0447]***
Baseline Specification?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2,671 7,317 6,615 8,873 2,192 3,222
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm
reports providing on the job training. Standard errors are clustered at the country and sector level. Columns (1) through (6) report the results of
estimating the baseline specification (column 3 of table 3) for different regional samples. Column (1) includes only firms in Africa, column (2)
includes firms in East Asia, column (3) includes firms in Eastern Europe, column (4) includes firms in Latin America, column (5) includes firms in
Middle East and North Africa and column (6) includes firms in South Asia. All the variables are defined in Table A.2. in the appendix.Table 6: Size-Training Premium: Robustness by Income Groups
Sample  Low Income  Middle -Low Income Middle High Income 
(1) (2) (3)
Small Firms 0.128 0.11 0.219
[0.0180]*** [0.0153]*** [0.0198]***
Medium Firms  0.305 0.293 0.384
[0.0292]*** [0.0205]*** [0.0194]***
Large Firms 0.432 0.392 0.405
[0.0353]*** [0.0223]*** [0.0158]***
Baseline Specification?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 7,040 17,317 5,287
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is a
dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm reports providing on the job training. Standard
errors are clustered at the country and sector level. Columns (1) through (3) report the results of
estimating the baseline specification (in column (3) of table 3) for different samples. Column
(1) includes only firms in low income countries, column (2) includes only countries in low-
middle income countries and column (3) includes only firms in high-middle income countries.
All the variables are defined in Table A.2. in the appendix. Table 7: Determinants of the Size-Job Training Differential: Role of Information, Contracts and Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Small Firms 0.144 0.0831 0.157 0.136 0.148 0.142 0.154
[0.0114]*** [0.0216]*** [0.0106]*** [0.0119]*** [0.0161]*** [0.0112]*** [0.0113]***
Medium Firms  0.328 0.278 0.345 0.344 0.326 0.327 0.35
[0.0148]*** [0.0287]*** [0.0134]*** [0.0181]*** [0.0197]*** [0.0146]*** [0.0152]***
Large Firms 0.421 0.352 0.439 0.453 0.411 0.419 0.439
[0.0157]*** [0.0277]*** [0.0135]*** [0.0187]*** [0.0203]*** [0.0158]*** [0.0153]***
Managerial Terciary Education  - 0.132 - - - - -
[0.0151]***
Share Temporary Contracts - - 0.00189 - - - -
[0.000248]***
Share Unionized Workers - - - 0.000924 - - -
[0.000255]***
Share of Profits Reinvested - - - - 0.000853 - -
[0.000131]***
Access to External Finance  - - - - - 0.0463 -
[0.0104]***
Uncertainty Economic Policy - - - - - - -0.0328
[0.0127]***
Baseline Specification?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country - Setctor Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 29,644 12,892 29,644 19,050 18,997 28,677 21,617
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm reports providing on
the job training. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Columns (1) reports the baseline specification as in column (3) of table 3. Column (2) through
(6) report different robustness based on alternative firm characteristics. In addition to column (1), we have controls for the managerial tertiary education (column
2), share of temporary contracts (column 3), share of unionized workers (column 4), share of profits reinvested (column 5), access to external finance (column 6)














Share in Overall 
Sample
AFRICA EAST EUROPE EAST ASIA
Angola2006 329 0.20 0.68 Albania2005 198 0.47 0.41 Cambodia2003 503 0.22 1.04
Benin2004 184 0.35 0.38 Armenia2005 329 0.35 0.68 China2003 3,900 0.73 8.03
Botswana2006 216 0.25 0.44 Azerbaijan2005 290 0.16 0.6 Indonesia2003 596 0.24 1.23
BurkinaFaso2006 51 0.43 0.10 Belarus2008 84 0.38 0.17 Laos2005 245 0.28 0.5
Burundi2006 238 0.13 0.49 BiH2005 180 0.46 0.37 Malaysia2002 897 0.42 1.85
Cameroon2006 118 0.42 0.24 Bulgaria2005 279 0.32 0.57 Mongolia2004 195 0.47 0.4
CapeVerde2006 47 0.43 0.10 Croatia2005 207 0.58 0.43 Philippines2003 667 0.22 1.37
DRC2006 253 0.09 0.52 Czech2005 262 0.6 0.54 Thailand2004 1,385 0.76 2.85
Ethiopia2002 412 0.22 0.85 Estonia2005 191 0.63 0.39 Vietnam2005 1,642 0.55 3.38
Gambia2006 159 0.14 0.33 FYROM2005 174 0.37 0.36 TOTAL EA 10,030 20.7
Ghana2007 616 0.27 1.27 Georgia2008 118 0.14 0.24
Guinea2006 239 0.15 0.490 Hungary2005 559 0.39 1.15 LATIN AMERICA
GuineaBissau2006 149 0.08 0.310 Kazakhstan2005 559 0.29 1.15 Argentina2006 650 0.48 1.34
Kenya2007 520 0.31 1.070 Kyrgyzstan2005 185 0.47 0.38 Bolivia2006 365 0.57 0.75
Lesotho2003 69 0.25 0.140 Latvia2005 178 0.52 0.37 Brazil2003 1,639 0.67 3.37
Madagascar2005 293 0.48 0.600 Lithuania2005 175 0.49 0.36 Chile2004 945 0.72 1.95
Malawi2005 155 0.50 0.320 Moldova2005 335 0.33 0.69 Colombia2006 633 0.5 1.3
Mali2007 619 0.16 1.270 Montenegro2003 100 0.31 0.21 CostaRica2005 343 0.46 0.71
Mauritania2006 204 0.14 0.420 Poland2005 937 0.48 1.93 Dom.Rep.2005 225 0.53 0.46
Mauritius2005 197 0.62 0.41 Romania2005 582 0.32 1.2 Ecuador2006 362 0.66 0.75
Mozambique2007 599 0.18 1.23 Russia2005 539 0.36 1.11 ElSalvador2003 465 0.5 0.96
Namibia2006 205 0.28 0.42 Serbia&Mont2005 259 0.46 0.53 Guatemala2003 455 0.54 0.94
Niger2005 125 0.34 0.26 Slovakia2005 194 0.79 0.4 Guyana2004 154 0.34 0.32
Nigeria2007 1,444 0.22 2.97 Tajikistan2008 116 0.23 0.24 Honduras2003 450 0.54 0.93
Rwanda2006 187 0.09 0.38 Turkey2008 851 0.39 1.75 Jamaica2005 89 0.62 0.18
Senegal2007 626 0.15 1.29 Ukraine2008 480 0.29 0.99 Mexico2006 1,118 0.32 2.3
SouthAfrica2007 1,057 0.41 2.18 Uzbekistan2008 121 0.23 0.25 Nicaragua2003 452 0.41 0.93
Swaziland2006 192 0.30 0.4 TOAL EE 8,482 17.47 Panama2006 239 0.42 0.49
Tanzania2006 338 0.33 0.7 MIDDLE EAST Paraguay2006 380 0.46 0.78
Uganda2006 405 0.28 0.83 Algeria2002 537 0.32 1.11 Peru2002 575 0.54 1.18
Zambia2007 603 0.19 1.24 Egypt2004 975 0.12 2.01 Uruguay2006 360 0.35 0.74
TOTAL AFR 10,849 22.33 Jordan2006 351 0.24 0.72 Venezuela2006 494 0.49 1.02
SOUTH ASIA Lebanon2006 354 0.68 0.73 Total LAC 10,393 21.4
Bangladesh2002 965 0.27 1.99 Morocco2004 846 0.19 1.74
India2006 2,154 0.16 4.43 Oman2003 325 0.21 0.67
Pakistan2002 965 0.11 1.99 Syria2003 527 0.22 1.08
SriLanka2004 427 0.33 0.88 WBankGaza2006 400 0.26 0.82
TOTAL SA 4,511 9.29 TOTAL ME 4,315 8.88 TOTAL 48,580 100
Source: Author's calculation based on Enterprise Surveys
Note: Table reports the sample composition for each country and the mean training intensityTable A.2. Variables Definitions
Variable Definition
Training Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm provides internal or external training to its workers.
Micro Firms  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has less than 11 employees
Small Firms  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has between 11 and 50 employees
Medium Firms  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has between 51 and 250 employees
Large Firms  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has more than 250 employees
Age of the Firm  Year of the survey minus the year when the firm started operations.
Capital City Dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located in the country's capital city
Public Ownership Dummy variable equal to 1 if 10% or more of the firm's capital owned by the government 
Exporter Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports directly or indirectly 10% or more.
Foreign Ownership  Dummy variable equal to 1 if 10% or more  firm's capital is owned by foreigners.
Openness Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm exports more than 10% of its sales or has more than 10% of foreign capital.
Technological Innovation
ISO Technlogical Certification Dummy if the firm has an ISO certification. 
Managerial Terciary Education Dummy variable equal to 1 if the manager has tertiary education
Share Skilled Workers  Firm's workforce that are managers, professionals, skilled production and non-production workers as a percentage of skilled and unskilled
production workers R&D Intensity 
High Technology Industries  Auto and auto-components, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, electronics, and metals and machinery.
Low-Technology Industries
Access to Finance  Dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm finances its investments through commercial banks or leasing arrangements.
Capacity Utilization  Percentage of firm's capacity being used in production
Value Added per employee (log) Sales minus inputs divided by total number of workers (in 2005 USD) 
Mean Wages (log)  Annual wage compensation divided by total number of workers (in 2005 USD)
Mean Training in Coutry-City -Sector
Share of firms in the coutry, 3-digit sector and city (capital city; city with more than 1 mln ind.; city with 250k-1mln ind.;  city with 50k-250k 
ind.;  city with less than 50k ind. and a dummy for unknown city dimension) that offer formal training programs.
Unionization  Dummy variable equal to 1 if more than 50% of the workforce in the firm is unionized. 
Share Females Workforce Share of female workers in the workforce
Av. Years of Education  Average years of schooling of the workforce. 
Source: Enterprise Surveys (World Bank).
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm introduced a new technology that substantially changed the way the main product was produced in the
three years prior to the survey.
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has design and R&D expenditures (e.g., labor costs with R&D personnel, materials or subcontracting
costs).
Beverages, food, garments, leather, non-metallic and plastic materials, paper, other manufacturing, textiles, and wood and furniture. These
definitions follow Parisi et al. (2006).Table A.3. Characteristics of Firms with Missing Training Information
(1) (2) (3)
Small Firms -0.0273 -0.0318 -0.015
[0.00325]*** [0.00374]*** [0.00332]***
Medium Firms  -0.0293 -0.0342 -0.0168
[0.00246]*** [0.00261]*** [0.00204]***
Large Firms -0.0275 -0.0308 -0.0142
[0.00229]*** [0.00228]*** [0.00206]***
Openness 0.00165 0.00125 -0.00303
[0.00366] [0.00413] [0.00244]
Age of the Firm (Log) -0.0012 -0.00155 -0.000119
[0.00200] [0.00227] [0.00100]
Public Ownership -0.00566 -0.00706 -0.00562
[0.00569] [0.00622] [0.00260]**
Share of Skilled Workers  0.0221 0.0277 0.0142
[0.00897]** [0.0112]** [0.00964]
Technological Innnovation - 0.00682 0.00131
[0.00363]* [0.00178]
Country-Sector Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  No 
Country -City-Sector Fixed Effects?  No  No  Yes 
Observations 14,900 12,530 18,462
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is
a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm reports providing on the job training. Standard
errors are clustered at the country level. We refer to the specification in column (3) of this
table as the baseline specification. All the variables are definied in Table A.2. in the appendix. Table A4: Determinants of the Size-Job Training Differential: Robustness Firm Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Small Firms 0.148 0.151 0.155 0.145 0.15
[0.0128]*** [0.0170]*** [0.0145]*** [0.0112]*** [0.0133]***
Medium Firms  0.331 0.317 0.325 0.332 0.364
[0.0159]*** [0.0220]*** [0.0181]*** [0.0149]*** [0.0181]***
Large Firms 0.418 0.412 0.395 0.429 0.474
[0.0172]*** [0.0238]*** [0.0190]*** [0.0158]*** [0.0182]***
Av. Education of the Workforce 0.0265 - - - -
[0.00754]***
Investment R&D - 0.191 - - -
[0.0146]***
ISO certification  - - 0.228 - -
[0.0139]***




Baseline Specification?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country-Sector Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 23,458 17,003 23,178 28,183 22,574
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1
when the firm reports providing on the job training. Standard errors are clustered at the country and sector level. Columns (1)
through (5) report different specifications. In addition to the baseline specification (in column 3 of table 3) we include av.
education of the workforce (captured by years of schooling) (column 1), Investment in R&D (column 2), ISO certification
(column 3), capacity utilization (column 4).  All the variables are defined in Table A.2. in the appendix. Table A5: Robustness on Determinants of the Size-Job Training Differential:  Mean Explanatory Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Small Firms 0.0638 0.151 0.125 0.144 0.139 0.154
[0.0208]*** [0.0110]*** [0.0131]*** [0.0149]*** [0.0121]*** [0.0115]***
Medium Firms  0.234 0.337 0.317 0.322 0.318 0.343
[0.0309]*** [0.0140]*** [0.0213]*** [0.0183]*** [0.0162]*** [0.0155]***
Large Firms 0.309 0.432 0.409 0.411 0.411 0.436
[0.0331]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0254]*** [0.0186]*** [0.0174]*** [0.0157]***
Mean Managerial Terciary Education  0.299 - - - - -
[0.0668]***
Mean Share Temporary Contracts - 0.00176 - - - -
[0.000706]**
Mean Share Unionized Workers - - 0.00105 - - -
[0.000545]*
Mean Share of Profits Reinvested - - - 0.000838 - -
[0.000558]
Mean Access to External Finance  - - - - 0.0819 -
[0.0428]* -0.0647
Mean Uncertainty Economic Policy - - - - - [0.0519]
Baseline Specification?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country - Setctor Fixed Effects?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 13,932 29,511 22,768 23,238 29,503 23,391
Source: Author's calculations are based on the Enterprise Suveys (World Bank)
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the firm
reports providing on the job training. Standard errors are clustered at the country and 3-digit sector level. Column (1) through (6) report
alternative specifictions of columns (2) through (6) of table 7 but computing the LHS variables with withs of firms located in the same country-
sector-location-size bin. Column (1) controls for the share of firms with managerial tertiary education, Column (2) for the mean share of
temporary contracts, column (3) for the mean share of unionized workers, column (4) for the mean share of reinvested profits, column (5) for the
share of firms with access to external finance and column (6) for the share of firms reporting uncertainty on the regulatory environment a high
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(small 1-49; medium 50-99; large 100+)